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SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY:
THE NFLPA AND NFL’S LOCKOUT SIDEAGREEMENT SUBJECTING CEDRIC BENSON TO
A SUSPENSION FOR HIS CONDUCT DURING THE
LOCKOUT VIOLATED THE UNION’S DUTY OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION
JOSÉ MARRERO
“I think he has way too much power.”1 Terrell Suggs’ statement
summarizes a growing attitude amongst players and fans who perceive the
commissioner of the National Football League (“NFL,” “League”) as a
dictator.2 Legal scholars have also fearfully suggested that the
commissioner’s role as the prosecutor, judge, and jury constitutes broad
power akin to that of a totalitarian regime.3
Through its ability to discipline players, the NFL has the power to fine or
suspend players like Michael Vick for their actions off the field.4 The
League has acquired this power over discipline through a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) which allows the commissioner


Trial attorney at the office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia.
JD, May 2012, American University, Washington College of Law ; B.S. Industrial and
Labor Relations, 2007, Cornell University. I want to thank the wonderful staff of the
Labor and Employment Law Forum, especially Jennifer Brown, Kyle deCant, Ben
Iwasaki, Pascal Moleus, William Kudrle, and Josh Tucker for their work and advice on
this piece. I am especially grateful to my parents for endlessly encouraging me and to
Katherine Bosch, Dennis Tristani, and Greg Reyes for their daily support.
1
Keith Van Valkenberg, Power Mad, ESPN (Dec. 28, 2012), http://espn.go.com/
nfl/story/_/id/8769645/has-nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-power-gone-too-far-espnmagazine (reporting that many players on the Baltimore Ravens and Pittsburgh Steelers
have taken issue with some of NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s decisions to fine or
suspend players).
2
See James Harrison Rips Roger Goodell, ESPN (July 14, 2011, 8:29 AM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6764826/james-harrison-pittsburgh-steelers-blastsroger-goodell-magazine-interview (referring to Goodell as “the devil” and “a
dictator”); see also Tom Weir, Brian Urlacher Puts ‘Dictatorship’ Tag on Roger
Goodell, USA TODAY (Nov. 19, 2010, 3:14 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/
communities/gameon/post/2010/11/brian-urlacher-roger-goodell-dictator/1
(quoting
Brian Urlacher as labeling the NFL as a “dictatorship [because] if Goodell wants to fine
you he’s going to fine you”).
3
Robert Ambrose, The NFL Makes it Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of its
Conduct Policy, the NFL Protects its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 1069, 1111 (2008).
4
NFL Suspends Michael Vick Indefinitely, CNN (Aug. 24, 2007),
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-08-24/us/michael.vick_1_phillips-and-vick-bad-newzkennels-animal-fighting-venture?_s=PM:US (noting that, when the NFL suspended
Michael Vick indefinitely, Roger Goodell sent the quarterback a letter informing him
that he was suspending him for “conduct that was not only illegal, but also cruel and
reprehensible”).
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to address “conduct on the playing field . . . [and] conduct detrimental to
the integrity of, or public confidence in the game of professional football.”5
However, the commissioner’s jurisdiction over discipline apparently
extends beyond the boundaries of the NFL. The Constitution and By-Laws
of the NFL authorize the commissioner to take appropriate steps when nonmembers of the League are guilty of conduct detrimental to the League or
even to professional football.6 The League’s interpretation of this section of
its Constitution—or of the CBA’s “conduct detrimental” provision—has
recently been under serious scrutiny as a result of decisions to discipline
individuals who were not employed by the League at the time of their
alleged detrimental behavior.7 For example, the League cited to the broad
provision when it suspended former Ohio State University quarterback
Terrelle Pryor in 2011 for conduct that occurred while he was in college—
conduct that occurred before he was ever employed by the NFL.8 Similarly,
the League recently suspended Cedric Benson after he was convicted of an
assault charge stemming from an incident that occurred during the NFL
lockout, while Benson was technically unemployed.9 This incident poses
more serious questions because the National Football League Players
Association (“NFLPA”) agreed to allow the League to discipline secondtime offenders like Benson for their conduct during the lockout.10 However,
while Benson filed a charge against the NLFPA for violating its duty of fair
representation, he later withdrew his case, confirming how powerful the
League may be.11
Despite whatever reasons Cedric Benson had for withdrawing the case,
this note will argue that the NFLPA committed an unfair labor practice
under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) when it signed a side5
Nat’l Football Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL
Management Counsel and the NFL Players Association, art. XLVI, § ¶ a, at 204
(2011), available at http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargainingagreement-2011-2020.pdf.
6
See Constitution and By-Laws of the National Football League, Art. 8.6, at 29
(1970) (Revised 2006) (“The Commissioner is authorized, at the expense of the
League, to hire legal counsel and take or adopt appropriate legal action or such other
steps or procedures as he deems necessary and proper in the best interests of either the
league or professional football, whenever any party or organization not a member of,
employed by, or connected with the league or any member thereof is guilty of any
conduct either detrimental to the league, its member clubs or employees, or to
professional football.”).
7
See Chris Mortenson, Terrelle Pryor to Appeal Ban, ESPN (Sept. 9, 2011, 9:02
AM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6949048/oakland-raiders-terrelle-pryor-appealfive-game-suspension-sources-say.
8
See discussion in infra Section IB.
9
See discussion in infra Section IC.
10
See id.
11
National Football League Players Association (Cincinnati Bengals) (09-CB065431, 2011). Docket activity available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CB065431#docket-footnote.
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agreement subjecting Benson to punishment for actions that occurred (1)
while the League was not operating and (2) while Benson was a free
agent.12 Had Benson maintained his case before the Board, the Board
should have found the NFLPA to be in violation of the NLRA. Part I
provides brief background information regarding the NFL’s authority to
discipline, the recent decisions to suspend Terrelle Pryor and Cedric
Benson, and the NFLPA’s duty to provide fair representation.13 Part II
argues that the NFLPA committed an unfair labor practice and breached its
duty to provide fair representation to Cedric Benson because (1)
negotiating away Benson’s rights runs counter to the objectives of the
NLRA and an employee union’s duty to provide fair representation; (2)
when the Union conceded jurisdiction over Benson’s lockout behavior, it
allowed the NFL to have unprecedented power over behavior that no sports
league has ever disciplined; and (3) it defies logic that the Union would
allow the League to discipline Benson for conduct that occurred when he
could not earn a paycheck from the League.14 Part III examines the likely
policy implications of the League’s recent decisions to discipline players
like Terrelle Pryor and Cedric Benson.15 Ultimately, this note concludes
that the NFL’s decisions to suspend Benson and Pryor set a dangerous
precedent, and the Union’s consent to subject Benson to the League’s
discipline—as opposed to contesting it—is violative of the labor
organization’s duty to provide fair representation to all of its members.16
I. BACKGROUND
A. The NFL’s Authority to Discipline Players [and Non-Players]
The above mentioned provisions of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws17
and the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and NFLPA 18
provide the League with weapons for disciplining any conduct that is
detrimental to the integrity of the League or professional football. Courts
have affirmed the League’s broad disciplinary powers.19 In Holmes v.
12
This note will focus on the legality of the Union’s decision to submit Benson to
league jurisdiction for his lockout behavior. Any possible legal claims against the NFL
will not be discussed because, as noted in infra Section IC, an arbitrator has already
ruled in favor of the NFL in a grievance filed by Benson. The running back’s NLRB
claim against the Union has not been decided and presents a more unique legal issue.
13
See discussion in infra Section I.
14
See discussion in infra Section II.
15
See discussion in infra Section III.
16
See discussion in infra Section IV.
17
See supra note 6.
18
See supra note 5.
19
See Nat’l Football Players Assoc. v. N.L.R.B, 503 F.2d 12, 15-16 (8th Cir. 1974)
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National Football League,20 a federal district court denied an NFL player’s
constitutional challenge alleging he was not afforded his full due process
rights when the commissioner, who was appointed by the CBA as the
arbitrator for drug appeals, upheld his suspension.21 The court noted that
the Commissioner’s power stemmed from the rules of a drug program that
the Union and the NFL had agreed to as part of the CBA.22 Therefore,
because the commissioner’s decision was consistent with the CBA, the
plaintiff was entitled to minimal due process protection.23 In response to
Holmes, an expert in the field of sports law suggested that “[i]t is evident . .
. that judges are not much inclined to overturn decisions made by
Commissioners about . . . player behavior that the Commissioner believes
is a threat to the integrity of the game.” 24 The extensive provisions in the
CBA and the NFL Constitution, and the judicial deference to the
commissioner’s decisions related to the integrity of the game, make Roger
Goodell a very powerful man.25
B. Terrelle Pryor
The NFL Commissioner’s controversial authority reached unprecedented
levels in 2011 when he suspended Terrelle Pryor, the Oakland Raiders’

(recognizing that the league has the power to fine players and that disciplinary actions
are reviewable pursuant to the NFL Constitution and By-laws); see also Suzanne
Janusz, Comment, The NFL’s Strict Enforcement of its Personal Conduct Policy for
Crimes Against Women: A Useful Tool for Combating Violence or an Attempt to
Punish Morality, 2 Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 93, 125 (2012) (interpreting the
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Nat’l Football Players Assoc. v. N.L.R.B. and recognizing
that while “owners cannot unilaterally take actions concerning wages, hours, or
working conditions without negotiating with the NFLPA . . . the commissioner can
impose disciplinary rules unilaterally by virtue of his authority to create policy with
respect to the provisions of the NFL’s Constitution and Bylaws and their
enforcement”). C.f. Oakland Raiders v. Nat’l Football League, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266,
285 n. 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (characterizing Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569
F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) by noting that “the Seventh Circuit noted that the baseball
commissioner had extremely broad authority over the affairs of the professional
baseball league”) (emphasis added).
20
939 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
21
See id.
22
Id. at 525.
23
See id. (concluding that “Holmes has not alleged that the Commissioner’s ruling
was procured by the parties’ fraud, or by dishonesty, bad faith,” and that the
suspension “drew its essence from the Drug Program and did not constitute the
Commissioner's own brand of industrial justice”).
24
PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS 61 (3d ed. 2004).
25
See Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The
Evolution and Mechanics of Commissioner Authority, 10 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L.
23, 54 (2008) (noting that, while there have been “several cases in the NBA and MLB
challenging commissioner ‘best interest’ rulings, such challenges are absent from
football”).
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third-round draft pick in the 2011 NFL Supplemental Draft.26 The NCAA
suspended the former Ohio State University (“OSU”) quarterback for five
games when he was found to have violated the association’s rules when he
sold memorabilia while still at OSU.27 Since Pryor would not be able to
comply with his five-game suspension at OSU once he was selected in the
NFL Supplementary Draft, the commissioner insisted that Pryor’s
behavior—which occurred before the quarterback was ever employed by an
NFL team—undermined the integrity of the NFL draft, and decided to
suspend Pryor for five games.28 Many have criticized the Commissioner’s
decision, claiming that it sets a precedent that retroactively allows the
League to fine or suspend current NFL players for their past NCAA
violations.29
C. Cedric Benson
Cincinnati Bengals running back Cedric Benson’s suspension is perhaps
even more eye-opening, as the NFLPA actually agreed to subject him to
discipline for an event that occurred (1) off the field, (2) while the League
was not operating, and (3) while Benson was a free agent.30 On July 17,
2011, Benson was arrested after he allegedly punched his former roommate
in the face.31 The incident occurred four months into the NFL lockout and
See Chris Mortenson, Terrelle Pryor to Appeal Ban, ESPN (Sept. 9, 2011, 9:02
AM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6949048/oakland-raiders-terrelle-pryor-appealfive-game-suspension-sources-say.
27
Id.
28
See Mike Florio, In Suspending Pryor, League Relied on General Provisions
Regarding ‘Detrimental Conduct’, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2011, 11:02 AM),
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/18/in-suspending-pryor-league-relied-ongeneral-provisions-regarding-detrimental-conduct/ (reporting that, in suspending Pryor,
Goodell relied on Article 8.6 of the NFL Constitution and By-laws, which authorizes
the commissioner to take appropriate steps when non-members of the league are guilty
of conduct detrimental to the league or to professional football).
29
See, e.g., Roger Goodell Gone Too Far, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2011, 2:39
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/22/tiebreak-goodell-nfl-pryorsuspension_n_933105.html (suggesting that Pryor’s suspension is “all about the
commish”); Tim Keown, Roger Goodell Merges NFL, NCAA, ESPN (Aug. 18, 2011,
5:00 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/id/6874169/terrelle-pryorsuspension-nfl-ncaa-merger (indicating that Goodell’s decision merges all NCAA rules
with NFL rules).
30
Lawyers in Cedric Benson Case Spar, ESPN (July 21, 2011, 10:51 AM), http://
espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6789751/lawyers-cedric-benson-cincinnati-bengalsclaiming-extortion-threat.
31
See Gregg Rosenthal, More Details Come out About Benson’s Arrest, NBC
SPORTS (July 18, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/18/
more-details-come-out-about-cedric-benson/; Mike Florio, Cedric Benson Arrested for
Assault, Again, NBC SPORTS (July 17, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://profootballtalk.
nbcsports.com/2011/07/17/cedric-benson-arrested-again (explaining accusations made
26
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after the Union had decertified.32 About two weeks after Benson’s arrest,
the Union recertified and was again able to operate as the players’
exclusive bargaining agent with the League.33 Shortly thereafter, the
League and the Union agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement.34
The Union and the League also signed an additional side-agreement,
exempting first time offenders from League discipline for off-the-field
behavior that occurred during the lockout.35 In exchange, however, the
agreement subjected eight players who were repeat offenders—including
Benson—to League discipline for their behavior during the lockout.36
About a month later, Benson was found guilty of assault, and sentenced to
twenty days in prison.37 The running back was subsequently released for
good behavior after serving a five-day sentence.38
While Benson did not have to miss any playing time due to his sentence
because he completed his term of incarceration prior to the start of the
NFL’s regular season, the mutually agreed-upon side agreement did keep
Benson off the field for a small part of the season. Three weeks into the
season, the League suspended Benson for three games for his conduct
during the lockout.39 Benson appealed the decision and the League reduced
against Pryor).
32
See John Clayton, NFL to Vote Thursday, ESPN (July 21, 2011, 5:48 PM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6789837/nfl-lockout-owners-vote-Thursday (noting
that the NFL lockout began on March 11, 2011); Report: NFL locks out players, who
file suit, ESPN (Mar. 12, 2011, 4:26PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=6205936 (explaining that the NFLPA decertified, thereby declaring itself out
of the business of representing NFL players).
33
See Report: NFLPA Recertified as Union, ESPN (July 30, 2011, 10:55 PM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/6818756/report-nfl-players-union-recertified-finalnegotiations-nfl (noting that the NFLP A was recertified as the NFL players’ exclusive
bargaining representative).
34
See, e.g. Goodell, Smith Sign 10-Year Collective Bargaining Agreement, CBS
SPORTS (Aug. 5, 2011), http://cbssports.com/nfl/story/15401364/goodell-smith-sign10year-collective-bargaining-agreement. (noting that the NFL and NFLPA had reached
a new collective bargaining agreement).
35
Mike Florio, NFL Attempts to Explain August 4 Letter Agreement, NBC Sports
(Oct. 29, 2011, 10:07 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/10/29/nflpaattempts-to-explain-august-4-letter-agreement.
36
Mike Florio, Fight Looming between NFL, NFLPA over Lockout Arrests, NBC
SPORTS (Sept. 24, 2011, 10:07 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/
24/fight-looming-between-nfl-nflpa-over-lockout-arrests/; see also Source: Cedric
Benson Files vs. NFLPA, ESPN (Sept. 25, 2011, 11:21 PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/
story/_/id/7018584/cedric-benson-cincinnati-bengals-files-nlrb-charge-vs-nflpa-sourcesays (listing Adam “Pacman” Jones, Johnny Jolly, Aqib Talib, Clark Haggan, Albert
Haynesworth, Kenny Britt, and Brandon Underwood as the other seven players).
37
Joe Reedy, Bengals’ Cedric Benson Released from Texas Jail, USA TODAY (Sept.
4, 2011, 1:47 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/bengals/story/201109-03/Bengals-Cedric-Benson-released-from-Texas-jail/50252194/1.
38
See id.
39
Mike Florio, Cedric Benson Gets Three Game Suspension, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 22,
2011, 4:26 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/09/22/cedric-benson-getsthree-game-suspension/.
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the punishment to a one-game suspension.40 Benson also unsuccessfully
filed a grievance against the League, arguing that the NFL did not have
jurisdiction over Benson’s actions during the lockout.41 Finally, Benson
filed an unfair labor practice grievance with the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB”) alleging that the Union unfairly agreed to subject him to
punishment, though the General Counsel of the NLRB accepted Benson’s
withdrawal on November 22, 2011.42
D. The NFLPA’s Duty of Fair Representation
The NLRA provides employees of an organization, including a
professional sports league, with the right to organize themselves into a
union, to engage in collective bargaining with their employer, and, at times,
to strike.43 Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits employers from interfering
with these rights, deeming such interference an unfair labor practice.44
While not explicitly mentioned in the NLRA, one of the protections that the
NLRB and the Supreme Court have recognized as inherent to these worker
protections is the union’s duty of fair representation.45 The union owes this
duty to all employees—even non-union members—during the negotiation
and execution of the collective bargaining agreement.46
A union breaches its duty of fair representation if its conduct toward an
employee is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”47 A union’s actions
are arbitrary only if, “in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time
of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of
reasonableness as to be irrational.”48 Moreover, union discriminatory
conduct violates the duty of fair representation if it is invidious.49 Finally, a
violation on the basis of bad faith “requires a showing of fraud, deceitful
40

See NFL Attempts to Explain August 4 Letter Agreement supra note 35.
See id.
42
See id. National Football League Players Association (Cincinnati Bengals) (09CB-065431, 2011). Docket activity available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/09-CB065431#docket-footnote.
43
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 277 (citing National Labor Relations
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (2006)).
44
Id.
45
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (outlining union activity that
constitutes a breach of the duty of fair representation); Hughes Tool, 104 N.L.R.B. 318,
329 (1953) (holding that a union could not charge non-union employees a flat-rate fee
for handling their grievances).
46
See Hughes Tool, 104 N.L.R.B. at 327 (stating that “all employees in an
appropriate unit are entitled, upon their request, to the impartial assistance of the
certified representative in the filing and adjustment of grievances.”).
47
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
48
Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991).
49
See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182 (noting that “[it] would raise grave constitutional
problems if unions were free to exercise this power to further racial discrimination.”).
41
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action, or dishonest action.”50 Accordingly, this note focuses on arbitrary
behavior because there is no evidence that the Union engaged in invidious
discriminatory conduct or fraud, deceit, or dishonesty.
A union’s behavior is arbitrary if it reflects a reckless disregard for the
rights of the individual employee, “but not if it represents only simple
negligence.”51 The union’s representation does not need to be error-free, as
courts have feared that holding labor organizations to a high standard of
care would hurt their ability to vigorously represent employees.52 In
Peterson v. Kennedy, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the NFLPA did not breach its duty of fair representation when it
provided a player with incorrect advice on whether to file an injury or noninjury grievance, resulting in the Statute of Limitations running out before
the player could file his grievance.53 In dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, the
Court noted that the NFLPA’s error was in mishandling a complex issue
and that the court would not hold the Union to a standard of perfection.54 In
light of this precedent, Cedric Benson’s claim against the NFLPA was
required to meet a high standard: the Union’s conduct must have been
egregious enough to overcome this significant hurdle.55
II. THE UNION COMMITTED AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE WHEN IT
AGREED TO SUBJECT BENSON TO A SUSPENSION FOR HIS CONDUCT
DURING THE LOCKOUT
The NFLPA breached its duty to fairly represent Cedric Benson when it
engaged in an agreement with the NFL allowing the League to discipline
Benson for his conduct during the lockout. The Union breached its duty in
three ways. First, when the Union conceded jurisdiction to the NFL over
Benson’s behavior during the lockout, it gave the League unprecedented
power over player discipline. The NFL’s jurisdiction over Benson’s
lockout behavior is contrary to other leagues’ approaches to lockout
discipline. Second, the way the NFLPA negotiated away Benson’s rights
runs counter to the objectives of the NLRA and its duty to provide fair
representation. Third, it defies logic that Benson could have reasonably
anticipated the League to have the ability to discipline him for conduct that
occurred when he could not earn a paycheck from that same employer.
50
Mock v. TG & Y Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 531 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971)).
51
See Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Robesky v.
Qantas Empire Airwaus Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1978)).
52
See id. at 1259 (noting that the Court was reluctant subject union representatives to
a higher standard due to policy considerations).
53
Id. at 1244.
54
Id.
55
See discussion in infra Section IC.
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These arguments will be discussed in turn.
First, a look at how sports leagues have handled player conduct during
lockouts provides a valuable perspective on whether a reasonable employee
would ever expect to be disciplined for off-the-field conduct that occurred
while the League locked him out. For example, two summers ago, Michael
Beasley, an NBA starter who was employed by the Minnesota
Timberwolves at the time, was arrested for possession of marijuana during
the NBA lockout.56 Like Benson, Beasley was a repeat offender.57
However, two weeks before Benson was arrested for assault, Tim Frank,
the NBA’s Senior Vice-President of Basketball Communications, openly
said that the League’s anti-drug agreement was not in effect during the
lockout.58 Sports writers have commented that the decision to discipline
Benson is the first instance of a league punishing a player for behavior that
occurred during the lockout.59
The notion that the NFLPA signed an agreement that gave the NFL
extensive jurisdiction over Benson’s lockout behavior is therefore
unprecedented. Even if the League’s decision to suspend Benson could
have survived a legal challenge because of the League’s broad bylaws and
judicial deference to the commissioner’s interpretation of the League’s
“best-interest” provisions,60 the Union’s side-agreement subjecting Benson
to discipline amounts to inefficient representation. Facilitating the League’s
expansion of its totalitarian desires constitutes the exact behavior that the
NLRA was designed to prevent unions from engaging in with rival
employers.61 The Union’s actions amount to more than the mere negligence
referred to in Peterson v. Kennedy.62 Labor unions have a duty to act in
good faith to represent the interests of their members to the best of their
abilities.63 Permitting the League to exercise jurisdiction over lockout
behavior—jurisdiction that no league has ever exercised or even claimed
that it had—and thus expanding the commissioner’s power to
56

Despite Bust, Michael Beasley Avoids NBA Substance-Abuse Policy, AOL
SPORTING NEWS (Jul. 7, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/nba/story/201107-07/despite-bust-michael-beasley-avoids-nba-substance-abuse-policy.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Ryan Wilson, Cedric Benson Gets 3 Game Suspension, CBS Sports (Sept. 22,
2011, 6:24 PM), http://eye-on-football.blogs.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/22475988/
32182757/?tag=contentMain;contentBody. (noting that Benson’s suspension is the first
instance of the NFL punishing a player for activity that occurred during a lockout).
60
Benson filed a grievance against the league and an arbitrator upheld the league’s
decision to suspend him. See Andrew Brandt, Benson Grievance Against NFL
Rejected, National Football Post (Oct. 29, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www.
nationalfootballpost.com/Benson-grievance-against-NFL-rejected.html.
61
See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 24, at 277.
62
See 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that simple negligence will not be
enough for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim against a union representative).
63
See 29 U.S.C. § 151-169.
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unprecedented levels is far outside any range of reasonableness for union
behavior.64
Second, Benson’s case involved exactly what the duty of fair
representation was designed to protect: the concern that individual players
would not be deprived of all avenues of protecting their interests.65 Here,
the Union not only failed to fairly represent Benson’s interests, but actually
bartered away his right to be free from the League’s decision to discipline
him for his conduct during the lockout, effectively abandoning him. 66 The
Union owes the duty of fair representation to the Cedric Bensons, Kenny
Britts, and Michael Vicks of the League as much as it owes it to a Tom
Brady or a Peyton Manning.67 Under federal labor law, a union cannot
disregard the interests of a player simply because the union does not like
the employee, or, alternatively, because the employee does not like or is not
a member of the union.68 Allowing the Union to decide that it will negotiate
away Benson’s right to play so that other players are not disciplined for
their conduct during the lockout is troublesome for the same reason: it
allows the Union to arbitrarily support some players more than others.69 By
choosing not to punish first-time offenders while simultaneously subjecting
repeat offenders, like Benson, to the League’s punishment, the Union
discriminated against a select population within the bargaining unit.70 The
duty of fair representation does not permit selective lawyering,71 and
64
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understand that advocating for the interests of guys like Britt, Talib, Brandon Marshall,
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precedent holds that this deliberate abandonment of Benson’s rights
constituted an unfair labor practice.72
Third, a player who was a free agent during an employer-instituted
lockout could not have reasonably expected to later be disciplined for his
behavior during that period. At the very least, the Union could have held
the position that the League lost its ability to punish the players when it
decided to lock them out.73 Alternatively, when the Union was discussing
the side-agreement with the NFL, it had a duty to inform Benson that he
could be subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of the League for his behavior
during the lockout.74 The Union did not inform Benson of this problem,
instead signing a side-agreement that would ultimately subject him to a
one-game suspension.75 The fact that the League could discipline Benson
during a time when the player did not have a right to a paycheck or medical
benefits defies logic. Tim Frank’s announcement that the NBA had no
jurisdiction over Michael Beasley’s lockout behavior is a reasonable
indication that neither Cedric Benson nor any athlete would have thought
that Goodell had the authority to punish the running back for his behavior
during the lockout.76 The NFLPA’s concession in this matter sets a
dangerous precedent.
III. THE LEAGUE’S DECISIONS TO SUSPEND PRYOR AND BENSON SET A
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT REGARDING THE COMMISSIONER’S POWER
Gabe Feldman, an associate professor and director of the sports law
program at Tulane University Law School,77 commented on the potential
implications of a league telling its players “you cannot be paid while we
lock you out but you can be punished.”78 Unfortunately for the players,
conduct toward a member is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith).
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Roger Goodell’s power is so broad that he now apparently has the
jurisdiction to discipline players for conduct that occurs while a player is
wholly unaffiliated with professional football—whether that person was a
college football player like Pryor or an out-of-work trouble-maker like
Benson.79 Either way, the League’s broad jurisdiction is troubling.
Punishing players for conduct that does not occur during times of official
employment creates major concerns regarding the NFL’s reach and its
ability to arbitrarily enforce policies. These concerns were illustrated when
Terrelle Pryor was suspended for five games, while Seattle Seahawks head
coach Pete Carroll was able to seek refuge in coaching a professional
football team when, after he left USC, it was discovered that Carroll also
violated NCAA rules.80
Another example of the policy’s unequal application was when Detroit
Lions head coach Jim Schwartz and former Oakland Raiders head coach
Tom Cable avoided any League discipline for physically confronting other
coaches.81 These on and off-the-field acts run afoul of the requirements of
the NFL Constitution and By-laws.82 However, according to Goodell,
neither of these coaches’ behavior is as troubling as Chicago Bears widereceiver Earl Bennett’s decision to wear orange cleats during a game. 83
Bennett received a $5,000 fine;84 Schwartz and Cable received warning
letters.85
Additionally, accepting the Pryor suspension as precedent, it seems
Goodell could now suspend Kellen Winslow Jr. and fellow University of
Miami players for their alleged ties with an infamous convicted booster
while they played college football.86 After all, in suspending Terrelle
79
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David Hough, Goodell Out of Bounds on this Ruling: Penalizing Pryor for his Sins
at OSU is a Slippery Slope, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2011, at C1.
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Pryor—a player who was disciplined for conduct that occurred while he
had never worked for the League—some say Goodell essentially merged
the NCAA and NFL codes of conduct.87 The minimal due process rights
owed by League commissioners to players, and the judicial deference owed
to Goodell’s decisions make these precedents quite frightening.88
The new collective bargaining agreement has not reined in Goodell’s
authority.89 The Terrelle Pryor and Cedric Benson precedents suggest that,
if the trend continues, players will need the assistance of their union leaders
to challenge the Commissioner’s authority. However, when the Union itself
concedes unprecedented authority to an already powerful commissioner,
the players are left with little recourse to protect their rights. If Cedric
Benson had maintained his case, the NLRB would have had an opportunity
to urge the NFLPA to be more reactive to the Commissioner’s trending
increase in authority. Perhaps this issue must await an athlete who is more
willing to sustain their claim against the NFLPA, despite all the pressures
that doing so may place.
IV. CONCLUSION
If he did not withdraw his case, Cedric Benson should have prevailed in
his NLRB challenge to the NFLPA’s side-agreement with the League.
When the Union decided to agree to subject Benson to the League’s
discipline—as opposed to contesting the League’s controversial,
authoritarian proposal—the labor organization violated its duty of fair
representation. Moreover, the NFL’s recent decisions to suspend Cedric
Benson and Terrelle Pryor raise concerns regarding the League’s ability to
discipline players for conduct that occurred while they were not employed
by the NFL. Labor unions were designed to level the playing field between
employees and employers. Unfortunately, when unions like the NFLPA
concede outrageous demands to employers and, in doing so, trade away
important individual player rights, employer dominance reaches
unprecedented levels. In order to uphold its obligation to fairly represent its
players, the NFLPA must be more reactive when the NFL decides to punish
players like Pryor and Benson for conduct that occurred while they could
not collect a paycheck from the League.
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